1651
NATURE (the art whereby God hath made and
governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this
also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal. For seeing life is but a
motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal part within, why
may we not say that all automata (engines that move themselves by springs and
wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life? For what is the heart, but a
spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints, but so many
wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by the Artificer?
Art goes yet further, imitating that rational and most excellent work of
Nature, man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH,
or STATE (in Latin, CIVITAS), which is but an artificial man, though of greater
stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an
artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates
and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and
punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and
member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the
body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the
strength; salus populi (the
people's safety) its business; counsellors, by whom
all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity
and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness;
and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of
this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that
fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.
To describe the nature of this artificial
man, I will consider * First, the matter thereof, and the artificer; both which
is man. * Secondly, how, and by what covenants it is made; what are the rights
and just power or authority of a sovereign; and what it is that preserveth and dissolveth it. *
Thirdly, what is a
Concerning the first, there is a saying much
usurped of late, that wisdom is acquired, not by reading of books, but of men.
Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other
proof of being wise, take great delight to show what they think they have read
in men, by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs. But there
is another saying not of late understood, by which they might learn truly to
read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, Nosce teipsum, Read thyself:
which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance either the barbarous state
of men in power towards their inferiors, or to encourage men of low degree to a
saucy behaviour towards their betters; but to teach
us that for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the
thoughts and passions of another, whosoever looketh
into himself and considereth what he doth when he
does think, opine, reason, hope, fear, etc., and upon what grounds; he shall
thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon
the like occasions. I say the similitude of passions, which are the same in all
men,- desire, fear, hope, etc.; not the similitude of the objects of the
passions, which are the things desired, feared, hoped, etc.: for these the
constitution individual, and particular education, do so vary, and they are so
easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted
and confounded as they are with dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and
erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth
hearts. And though by men's actions we do discover their design sometimes; yet
to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing all
circumstances by which the case may come to be altered, is to decipher without
a key, and be for the most part deceived, by too much trust or by too much
diffidence, as he that reads is himself a good or evil man.
But let one man read another by his actions
never so perfectly, it serves him only with his
acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole nation must read
in himself, not this, or that particular man; but mankind: which though it be
hard to do, harder than to learn any language or science; yet, when I shall
have set down my own reading orderly and perspicuously, the pains left another
will be only to consider if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind
of doctrine admitteth no other demonstration.
NATURE
hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there
be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than
another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man
is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any
benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. For as to the strength
of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by
secret machination or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger
with himself.
And
as to the faculties of the mind, setting aside the arts grounded upon words,
and especially that skill of proceeding upon general and infallible rules,
called science, which very few have and but in few things, as being not a
native faculty born with us, nor attained, as prudence, while we look after
somewhat else, I find yet a greater equality amongst men than that of strength.
For prudence is but experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in
those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make
such equality incredible is but a vain conceit of one's own wisdom, which
almost all men think they have in a greater degree than the vulgar; that is,
than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by fame, or for concurring
with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men that howsoever
they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent or more
learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves; for
they see their own wit at hand, and other men's at a distance. But this proveth rather that men are in that point equal, than
unequal. For there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution
of anything than that every man is contented with his share.
From
this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in
the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing,
which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way
to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation
only) endeavour to destroy or subdue one another. And
from hence it comes to pass that where an invader hath no more to fear than
another man's single power, if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient
seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to
dispossess and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour,
but also of his life or liberty. And the invader again is in the like danger of
another.
And
from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure
himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master
the persons of all men he can so long till he see no other power great enough
to endanger him: and this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed. Also, because there be
some that, taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of
conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires, if others,
that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by
invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing
only on their defence, to subsist. And by
consequence, such augmentation of dominion over men being necessary to a man's conservation, it ought to be allowed him.
Again,
men have no pleasure (but on the contrary a great deal of grief) in keeping
company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same
rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing
naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which
amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet is far enough to
make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example.
So that in the nature of man, we find three principal
causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly,
diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The
first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for
safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make
themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the
second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different
opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by
reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or
their name.
Hereby
it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep
them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war
as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth
not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the
will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of
time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the nature of
weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not
in a shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days
together: so the nature of war consisteth not in
actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there
is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace.
Whatsoever
therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every
man, the same consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than
what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry,
because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the
earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea;
no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time;
no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and
danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short.
It
may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things that Nature
should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another:
and he may therefore, not trusting to this inference, made from the passions,
desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience. Let him therefore
consider with himself: when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go
well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his
house he locks his chests; and this when he knows there be laws and public
officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done him; what opinion he has
of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow citizens, when he
locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests.
Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words?
But neither of us accuse man's nature in it. The
desires, and other passions of man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the
actions that proceed from those passions till they know a law that forbids
them; which till laws be made they cannot know, nor can any law be made till
they have agreed upon the person that shall make it.
It
may peradventure be thought there was never such a time nor condition of war as
this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there
are many places where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of
America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all, and
live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before. Howsoever, it may be
perceived what manner of life there would be, where there were no common power
to fear, by the manner of life which men that have formerly lived under a
peaceful government use to degenerate into a civil war.
But
though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a condition
of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign
authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and in
the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing, and their
eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the
frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours,
which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of
their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the
liberty of particular men.
To
this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing
can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have
there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law,
no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and
injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor mind. If they were,
they might be in a man that were alone in the world,
as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in
society, not in solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition that
there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine
distinct; but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as
he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition which man by mere nature is
actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting
partly in the passions, partly in his reason.
The
passions that incline men to peace are: fear of death; desire of such things as
are necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to obtain
them. And reason suggesteth convenient articles of
peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which
otherwise are called the laws of nature, whereof I shall speak more
particularly in the two following chapters.
THE
right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale,
is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the
preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and
consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement
and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.
By
liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the
absence of external impediments; which impediments may oft take away part of a
man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power
left him according as his judgement and reason shall
dictate to him.
A
law of nature, lex naturalis,
is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden
to do that which is destructive of his life, or taketh
away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that
speak of this subject use to confound jus and lex,
right and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear; whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of
them: so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in
one and the same matter are inconsistent.
And
because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter)
is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one
is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may
not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to
every thing, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural
right of every man to every thing endureth, there can
be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever
he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently it is a precept, or
general rule of reason: that every man ought to endeavour
peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it,
that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war. The first branch of
which rule containeth the first and fundamental law
of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it. The second, the sum of the
right of nature, which is: by all means we can to defend ourselves.
From
this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law: that a man be
willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down
this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men
as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war. But if
other men will not lay down their right, as well as he, then there is no reason
for anyone to divest himself of his: for that were to expose himself to prey,
which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that
law of the gospel: Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do
ye to them. And that law of all men, quod tibi fieri
non vis, alteri
ne feceris.
To
lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of
hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceth or passeth away his
right giveth not to any other man a right which he
had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by
nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may
enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without hindrance
from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to
one man by another man's defect of right is but so much diminution of
impediments to the use of his own right original.
Right
is laid aside, either by simply renouncing it, or by transferring it to
another. By simply renouncing, when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth. By transferring, when he intendeth
the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons….
Whensoever a man transferreth his right, or renounceth
it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself, or for some other good he hopeth
for thereby. For it is a voluntary act: and of the voluntary acts of every man,
the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights which no
man can be understood by any words, or other signs, to have abandoned or
transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that
assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to
aim thereby at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds, and chains,
and imprisonment, both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience,
as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned,
as also because a man cannot tell when he seeth men proceed
against him by violence whether they intend his death or not. And lastly the
motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is
introduced is nothing else but the security of a man's person, in his life, and
in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a
man by words, or other signs, seem to despoil himself of the end for which
those signs were intended, he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or
that it was his will, but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions
were to be interpreted.
The
mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract.
There
is difference between transferring of right to the thing, the thing, and
transferring or tradition, that is, delivery of the thing itself. For the thing
may be delivered together with the translation of the right, as in buying and
selling with ready money, or exchange of goods or lands, and it may be
delivered some time after.
Again,
one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and
leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the
meantime be trusted; and then the contract on his part is called pact, or
covenant: or both parts may contract now to perform hereafter, in which cases
he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called
keeping of promise, or faith, and the failing of performance, if it be
voluntary, violation of faith….
If a
covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust
one another, in the condition of mere nature (which is a condition of war of
every man against every man) upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if
there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to
compel performance, it is not void. For he that performeth
first has no assurance the other will perform after, because the bonds of words
are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions,
without the fear of some coercive power; which in the condition of mere nature,
where all men are equal, and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot
possibly be supposed. And therefore he which performeth
first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the right he can never
abandon of defending his life and means of living.
But
in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those that would
otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that
cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so to do.
The
cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid,
must be always something arising after the covenant made, as some new fact or
other sign of the will not to perform, else it cannot
make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising
ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.
FROM
that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights
as, being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth
a third; which is this: that men perform their covenants made; without which
covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all
things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.
And
in this law of nature consisteth
the fountain and original of justice. For where no covenant hath preceded,
there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything and
consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is
made, then to break it is unjust and the definition of injustice is no other
than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust is
just.
But
because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on
either part (as hath been said in the former chapter), are invalid, though the
original of justice be the making of covenants, yet injustice actually there
can be none till the cause of such fear be taken away; which, while men are in
the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just
and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men
equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment
greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to
make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of
the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the
erection of a Commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary
definition of justice in the Schools, for they say that justice is the constant
will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there is no own, that
is, no propriety, there is no injustice; and where there is no coercive power
erected, that is, where there is no Commonwealth, there is no propriety, all
men having right to all things: therefore where there is no Commonwealth, there
nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice consisteth
in keeping of valid covenants, but the validity of covenants begins not but
with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them:
and then it is also that propriety begins….
And
though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be taken
notice of by all men, whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the
rest too negligent to understand; yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have
been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity;
and that is: Do not that to another which thou wouldest
not have done to thyself, which showeth him that he
has no more to do in learning the laws of nature but, when weighing the actions
of other men with his own they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part
of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions and
self-love may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these laws
of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable….
THE final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally
love liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint
upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight
of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to
say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is
necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions of men when
there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of
punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws
of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters.
For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty,
mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves,
without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to
our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the
like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of
no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws
of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them,
when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or not great enough
for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and
art for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived
by small families, to rob and spoil one another has been a trade, and so far
from being reputed against the law of nature that the greater spoils they
gained, the greater was their honour; and men
observed no other laws therein but the laws of honour;
that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of
husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms, which
are but greater families (for their own security), enlarge their dominions upon
all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given
to invaders; endeavour as much as they can to subdue
or weaken their neighbours by open force, and secret
arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after
ages with honour….
The only way to erect such a common power, as may be
able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one
another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry
and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live
contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon
one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices,
unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of
men, to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be
author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person
shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace
and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their
judgements to his judgement.
This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one
and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such
manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise
and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of
men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the
multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS.
This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more
reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our
peace and defence. For by this authority, given him
by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power
and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form
the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies
abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the
Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great
multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one
the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he
shall think expedient for their peace and common defence.
And he that carryeth this
person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and every one
besides, his subject